Ethical standards for computer professionals: A comparative analysis of four major codes

Professions have adopted ethical codes and codes of conduct. Physicians, lawyers, engineers, and other professionals have moral responsibilities. They know to whom they are responsible. Professionals in the data processing field, too, need to know that they have moral responsibilities and to whom they are responsible. This paper compares and evaluates the ethical codes of four major organizations of computer professionals in America. The analysis is done along the following obligations that every professional has: to society, to the employer, to clients, to colleagues, to the professional organization, and to the profession.Professionals in the information technology field have no single, agreed upon code of conduct. In the US alone there are four organizations promoting four different codes. While some of the behavioral precepts are similar, others are not. People who are members of more than one organization may wonder how they should act in certain circumstances. Furthermore, computer professionals are not provided with any guidance for cases of ethical conflicts.Flaws of the four codes and differences among them are discussed, examples of moral dilemmas are given, and points for improvement are suggested.Effy Oz is an assistant professor of Management Information Systems in the School of Business Administration at Wayne State University, and the coordinator of the MIS program. He has published articles inInformation Executive, OMEGA, Decision Sciences, Information & Management, Journal of Systems Management, andMiS Quarterly.     

Copyright protection and hardware taxation

This paper investigates the recently practiced method of taxing hardware and transferring the proceeds to software makers, or artists in general. We characterize the conditions under which the policy of compensating copyright owners for infringements on their intellectual property using hardware taxation is inefficient.     

Customer Privacy and Competition

We analyze how different degrees of privacy protection affect industry profits, consumer welfare, and total welfare in a model with switching costs. Firms earn higher profits under weak privacy protection compared with strong or no privacy protection. The relationship between the degree of privacy protection and equilibrium profits is not monotonic. Consumer surplus and total welfare increase with the degree of privacy protection unless firms recognize consumer‐specific switching costs. In that case, pricing conditional on switching costs has favorable implications for consumer surplus and total welfare.     

Noncompete agreements,training, and wage competition

We study the effects of noncompete agreements in an environment where firms invest in training junior workers. After obtaining employer-provided training, trained workers can choose whether to remain loyal to their initial employer or switch to the competing employer. We evaluate the effects of noncompete agreements on wages, employment, investment in training, production, profits, and total welfare. Firms earn higher profits and pay lower average wage when they require workers to sign noncompete agreements.